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Promising Visions and Strategies to Advancing Global Democracy

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I. OVERVIEW

There is a vital need to reflect critically on the desirability of and the possibilities for democratizing global governance. Significant democratic deficits are limiting the democratic participation of citizens and key stakeholders as well as affecting the capacities of existing global governance institutions to address effectively critical global issues ranging from peace and human security, to human rights and gender justice, equitable development, and ecological sustainability. What should be the roles and responsibilities of various actors such as global governance institutions, states, transnational corporations, civil society organizations, and citizens for overcoming the current democratic deficits in the global governance system? What are the most promising opportunities for reforming and transforming existing global institutions as well as creating alternative global democratic institutions?

Given the existing rules and regulatory institutions that shape globalization and the overall architecture of the global governance system, what are global civil society's proactive proposals to build a more democratically governed world? This analysis highlights promising approaches to advancing global democracy ranging from empowering a democratic global civil society, actualizing the democratic potential of parliamentary initiatives, and building democratic linkages at the local, national, regional and global levels that each contribute to democratizing the global economy and global governance. Finally, this analysis highlights promising visions and strategies that global civil society, diverse in its interests but potentially united in its aspirations for a more just and democratic world, can engage with other key actors in creating a global democratic future.

II. The Context and Objectives

“The idea of democracy as a universal commitment is quite new, and it is quintessentially a product of the twentieth century.”

– Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize Laureate¹

Global democracy is emerging as the new multi-dimensional challenge of our time. While the 20th Century witnessed the triumph of democracy as an idea, the fundamental challenge of the 21st Century is to overcome the crisis of democracy in terms of fully realizing its democratic principles, priorities, processes, policies, and practices, especially at the global level. Various scholars have proposed a range of approaches with different trajectories and institutional arrangements for democratizing global governance that rethink the existing international system created since 1945.² At the same time, leading civil society organizations and networks have engaged in advocacy for democratizing key global institutions such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization (WTO) and have created new alternative institutions such as the World Social Forum (WSF) and regional forums to enable new democratic forms of citizen empowerment.³ Finally, recognizing the need to address the growing democracy deficit at the global level, leading political leaders have issued various appeals for reforming and democratizing the major institutions of global governance ranging from the United Nations to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.⁴ Despite these important efforts, little shared understanding and agreement exists about how to assess critically these approaches, and how to impact positively and to democratize global governance – that is, the rules and regulatory institutions that shape globalization and the overall architecture of the global governance system. Consequently, there is a vital need to reflect critically on the desirability of and the possibilities for democratizing global governance.

Global civil society advocacy and social mobilization have contributed, in certain contexts, to “restructuring world politics” and to democratizing the practices of states and global governance institutions.⁵ However, asymmetries in power relations require the development of effective democratic mechanisms for participation, accountability, representation, deliberation, and transparent decision-making among global civil society organizations, states, and global governance institutions.⁶ Efforts are urgently needed to understand both the visions and the practical ideas for exercising power through existing institutions and creating alternative democratic governance arrangements at the global level. Consequently, it is now time to understand the diverse range of approaches to advancing global democracy, identify the criteria for evaluating these approaches, assess their potential trajectories, and share lessons for advancing democratic theory, strategy, and practice at the global level.

III. A Framework for Understanding Global Democracy

The overall focus is on democracy as both a set of principles and processes for re-orienting governance and deepening its institutional bases at the global level. After decades of undemocratic and ineffective global governance on key global issues ranging from development, to environment, human rights, trade, and security, now is the time to

privilege and highlight the visions and views of civil society leaders around the world. The principal focus of this analysis is to explore promising civil society visions and strategies to advancing global democracy.

First, this agenda means moving beyond the existing institutional architecture to explore proposed visions for a new democratic, global governance system. Second, given the divergent and often competing visions and conceptions of how to achieve global democracy, it is critical to define and clarify the overall terms of debate and criteria for analysis and assessment. Third, this agenda means not focusing solely on individual global governance institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), but also thinking about the multiple levels and rules of governance in order to address broader systemic change issues. Targeting one or two key global governance institutions for reform and democratization will inevitably lead to divergent institutional priorities, while neglecting the need to think about democratizing other key arenas, such as the global economy and the Internet, and other key actors, such as the 195 states, 300 inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), 60,000 transnational corporations, international courts, and the 40,000 international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) that comprise global civil society itself, all of which contribute in varying degrees to shaping the democratic prospects and trajectory of the overall global governance system.⁷ Fourth, this agenda requires fostering an enabling political environment for new democratic political spaces for sustained and effective dialogue, deliberation, and action to emerge. Ultimately, the emphasis is on knowledge building and exchange that enhances democratic participation, advances democratic empowerment, and develops effective mechanisms for responsive democratic governance that lead to durable mid- and macro-level social change.

IV. Addressing Key Deficits that Affect Democratic Participation: Goals and Strategies

On the demand side of the global democracy equation, four key deficits adversely affect the possibilities for democratic participation by citizens and key stakeholders at the global level. The challenge is how to foster democratic forms of active global citizenship that are inclusive and empower people to participate in the multi-faceted decisions that affect their lives.

First, a key deficit is low citizen awareness of and low levels of participation in global governance processes and issues.⁸ The primary goal to address this deficit is to ***increase the quantity of democratic participation.***⁹ The specific strategies focus on increasing the number of citizens and stakeholders and the intensity of their participation by promoting active citizenship on global governance issues. This means increasing the number of citizens and stakeholders involved, or the percentage of the population engaged, and increasing the number of organizations and coalitions engaged in global governance issues, where appropriate.

Second, ineffective institutions and processes of global governance limit democratic participation.¹⁰ Without effective mechanisms for meaningful participation, the

possibilities for enhancing dialogue and improving governance are limited. The main goal to address this deficit is to **increase the quality of democratic participation**.¹¹ The specific strategies focus on deepening the knowledge, skills, and involvement of active citizens and stakeholders, and on enhancing the overall discourse and tenor of their deliberations. This means improving existing opportunities for participation through enhanced organizational effectiveness and creating new more meaningful opportunities for citizens and stakeholders to participate. This also means enhancing the quality of stakeholders' contributions to the deliberations through skill-building opportunities and citizen education.

Third, significant inequalities and disparities in social structures undermine and limit democratic participation in global governance.¹² The negative management of inequitable societal factors such as race, ethnicity, gender, or class excludes or limits a citizen's or group's access to participate fully in democratic processes. The goal to address this deficit is to **increase the equality of democratic participation**.¹³ The specific strategies focus on diversifying the mix of stakeholders and on ensuring access and a place at the table for those stakeholders who are disenfranchised, marginalized, discriminated against, and/or under-represented due to their race, ethnicity, gender, age, wealth, geography or other factor. This means identifying structures and other factors (e.g., cultural) that serve to include or exclude, leveraging positive social differences while minimizing negative social disparities in order to increase participation, access, influence and representation of under-represented groups by race, class, ethnicity, age, gender and religion. Extending the scope of inclusiveness also means elevating, where appropriate, those citizens and groups, especially from the Global South, who have been "marginalized" to "center stage" to help strengthen the links between informal and formal networks, and to recognize and embrace the concerns, perspectives and ideas of silent and unheard voices in the process of enhancing democratic governance.

The fourth deficit affecting democratic participation is the lack of institutional capacity for sustained action on global governance issues. Ongoing institutional capacities are critical to durable (and possibly systemic) change that has reinforcing effects on actualizing democratic norms, legal and cultural processes, policies, and practices. The main goal to address this deficit is to **increase the sustainability of democratic participation**.¹⁴ The specific strategies focus on strengthening existing venues or opportunities for participation, identifying and nurturing emerging strategies and innovations that build ongoing institutional capacities for common public action over the long-term, and creating an enabling political environment that removes barriers and fosters sustained participation in democratic governance in terms of both processes and practices.

Table 1 below provides a summary of these four democratic deficits affecting citizens' democratic participation, emphasizes the goals and specific strategies for addressing each of these deficits, and highlights possible opportunities as well as responsibilities for global civil society to increase all forms of democratic participation in order to enhance and to deepen democratic global governance.

TABLE 1: Addressing Democratic Deficits: Goals, Strategies and Opportunities for Increasing Democratic Participation¹⁵

KEY DEMOCRATIC DEFICITS	GOALS	SPECIFIC STRATEGIES	OPPORTUNITIES FOR GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY
Low Citizen Awareness of and Participation in Global Governance Processes and Issues	<i>Increase the Quantity of Democratic Participation</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase citizen awareness and active (global) citizenship. • Increase the number of citizens engaged in global governance issues. • Increase the number of organizations and coalitions engaged in global governance activities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen citizens' understanding of global processes through education. • Increase discussion of global governance issues in the media. • Requires democratizing civil society organizations.
Ineffective Institutions and Processes of Global Governance	<i>Increase the Quality of Democratic Participation</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase the number of informed, skilled and active citizens and stakeholders. • Increase public deliberation of global governance issues. • Increase the number of well-resourced and effective organizations. • Increase the level of inter-organizational cooperation across sectors. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop effective mechanisms for public deliberation. (e.g. Social Forums) • Strengthen parliamentary oversight and accountability. • Increase advocacy that promotes transparency, accountability, and democratic decision-making processes by global actors.
Significant Inequalities and Disparities in Social Structures that Undermine Global Governance	<i>Increase the Equality of Democratic Participation</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase access, influence and representation for under-represented citizens and stakeholders at global level. • Increase the types of public spaces and venues to be more inclusive or support alternative practices and perspectives. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure access and representation for all actors and stakeholders. • Remove barriers that limit participation of key groups that are underrepresented (e.g. Global South) • Increase advocacy for redistribution of resources.
Lack of Institutional Capacity for Sustained Action on Global Governance Issues	<i>Increase the Sustainability of Democratic Participation</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen ongoing institutional capacities for long-term public action. • Create an enabling environment that removes barriers and fosters sustained participation in democratic governance. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop supportive democratic structures and policies. • Build partnerships across sectors. • Foster global citizenship and solidarities.

V. Four Key Democratic Deficits Affect Global Governance Institutions

On the supply side of the global democracy equation, global governance institutions face four democratic deficits. Many global institutions have experienced significant institutional challenges with regard to democratic process and practice, their capacity to act, their ability to mobilize resources, and the strategic vision to meet their mandates. In some notable instances, global civil society networks and coalitions have emerged to seize initially the initiative and fill the leadership void of global governance institutions (and states) on key issues (i.e., the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines; Kyoto Protocol), to play a watchdog role by mobilizing to oppose secret negotiations over proposed rules governing foreign direct investment (i.e., Multilateral Agreement on Investment), or to catalyze advocacy campaigns that have compelled global institutions to act on key policy issues (i.e., Jubilee debt relief; World Commission on Dams).

1. Democratic Deficits of Global Governance Institutions

There is a growing consensus that existing global governance institutions face major democratic challenges due to issues of participation, transparency, representation, accountability, decision-making and effectiveness.¹⁶ Many of these global governance institutions have limited, if any, formal provisions for citizen consultation and parliamentary oversight, thus highlighting the need for new democratic mechanisms for accountability and alternative participatory processes at the global level.¹⁷ For instance, in debating possible options for the future, a survey by Global Scan found that two-thirds of civil society leaders envision a more democratic and representative United Nations that “is directly accountable to citizens” as their preferred ideal form of global governance by the year 2020.¹⁸ While strengthening and democratizing key institutions, such as the United Nations, is an important first step, addressing these institutions’ democratic deficits is not an end in itself, but just a key entry point for leveraging the institutional capacity, resources, and vision to put into place effective democratic processes and global governance institutions.

2. Action Deficits of Global Governance Institutions

Another fundamental issue is the lack of institutional responsiveness and effectiveness of global governance institutions in addressing key global priorities ranging from reducing poverty, eradicating hunger, ensuring peace and human security, addressing public health crises (i.e., HIV/AIDS and SARS), reducing global warming, to preventing financial crises. A recent report by the World Economic Forum and the Brookings Institution found that existing efforts by global institutions are failing to address adequately eight major global problems from security to economic development and environmental issues.¹⁹ In addition, the IMF’s belated and ineffective handling of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 that affected Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia, then subsequently Russia and Brazil, prompted calls for a “new international financial architecture” (NIFA) to ensure proper and timely handling of future economic crises.²⁰ Due to governments’ inaction on global warming issues, civil society organizations took the lead for drafting and mobilizing support for the Kyoto Protocol. Clearly there is a

critical need to break out of this “unconscionable inaction” mode by developing both a shared strategic plan and capacity for global action across sectors in order to mobilize effectively.²¹

3. Resource Deficits of Global Governance Institutions

Despite demonstrated needs and demands for additional resources to address pressing global problems, some global governance institutions, such as the United Nations, have been plagued by chronic resource deficits in terms of funds, personnel, and technical assistance, thus limiting their capacity to fulfill their mandates. Robert Johansen cogently notes that:

“a global decision-making mechanism does not exist where concerned citizens and members of parliaments and congresses from many countries may focus attention for new revenue-raising measures and where legislators, who control the purse strings, have legitimacy to raise and then decide how to spend global revenues once raised.”²²

Recognizing the challenges for strengthening the capacity for coordination, civil society networks and coalitions have addressed resource shortages through collective action efforts at information-sharing, monitoring, and advocacy campaigns at the global level to mobilize funding in a number of key areas from debt relief, to HIV/AIDS prevention, and humanitarian aid for natural disasters such as the recent South Asian tsunami.²³

4. Vision Deficits of Global Governance Institutions

A critical challenge facing global governance institutions is the lack of capacity to formulate and to act on their strategic visions. As Robert Johansen argues, the combination of “almost no global democratic governing capacity, little global action beyond rhetoric, and few resources to address global problems” has produced a “vision deficit” characterized by a fundamental lack of leadership and strategy for joint action.²⁴ For example, decisions and practices are often left to the discretion of technocrats and staff of these global institutions to interpret with little oversight or broader vision to guide their actions. This situation was perhaps most strikingly epitomized when the United Nations and other key actors failed to prevent genocide in Rwanda in 1994.²⁵ With mission creep and expanding mandates becoming the order of the day, the fundamental question arises whether the existing set of global governance institutions can overcome these multiple challenges and ultimately deliver positive results. In contrast, despite difficult odds, leaders within global civil society have had the vision to launch successful major global campaigns from the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines to the Jubilee coalition championing debt relief for developing countries.²⁶ The implications of this analysis are clear:

- *Where will the leadership and vision come from to mobilize efforts to address these four deficits that affect global governance institutions?*
- *Do leaders in global civil society, both individually and collectively, possess the democratic skills and strategic visions necessary to lead this effort in cooperation and collaboration with other key actors (states, transnational corporations, global governance institutions, etc.)?*

VI. Promising Approaches for Advancing Global Democracy

What are the most promising approaches for advancing global democracy? What mechanisms for representation, accountability, and responsive governance are needed that will enable the redistribution of power among global institutions toward more democratic outcomes? What should be the roles and responsibilities of various actors such as global governance institutions, states, businesses, civil society organizations, and citizens for overcoming the current democratic deficit in the global governance system? In light of the shifting trends in global governance away from states as the primary actors to a multiplicity of non-state actors, what are global civil society's proactive proposals to build a more democratically governed world? Specifically, what broad strategic agenda and concerted actions will strengthen the democratic forces within global civil society and beyond to act as a counter-balance to the negative forms of economic and political globalization that undermine the principles of human security, peace, justice, equity, ecological sustainability, cultural diversity, and democracy at the local, national, regional, and global levels? Finally, what visions and strategies can global civil society, diverse in its interests but potentially united in its aspirations for a more democratic future, propose as possible means for advancing global democracy?

A. Developing Proactive Strategies for Civil Society

While there is no one universally accepted definition of this evolving concept, *global democracy* broadly “means real economic, political, cultural rights and influence for the majority of the world’s people over the local and global institutions that affect their lives.”²⁷ There are three complementary strategies for civil society to enhance global democracy. **Table 2** summarizes below those forms of participation, empowerment, and governance and the structures that contribute to, enhance, and deepen democracy.

1. Enhancing Democratic Participation

Democratic participation is the process by which citizens and key stakeholders actively engage individually and collectively in the economic, political and cultural activities of a broad range of organizations, networks, movements and governance institutions for democratic purposes. Participation needs to be viewed within a broad democratic framework. The focus is on fostering active global citizenship and inclusive forms of participation that contribute to or enhance democracy and its tenets of freedom, equality, and justice. However, increased participation by itself may not necessarily result in positive decisions, effective outcomes and sustainability, unless there are meaningful

forums and democratic political spaces for broad consultation and representation; no stakeholder exerts undue influence over governance decisions; and an enabling democratic political environment is fostered.

2. Enhancing Democratic Empowerment

Democratic empowerment is the process by which citizens and key stakeholders act on their rights and gain greater economic, cultural and political voice and influence over the decisions affecting their lives. Key elements include strengthening equality, representing diverse perspectives and communities, and amplifying the voices of disadvantaged and disenfranchised citizens. Through effective public education, skills-building and advocacy, citizens and key stakeholders gain the knowledge to engage in democratic deliberation, debate and contestation focused on the decisions, policies and practices of key actors such as governments, global institutions, and transnational corporations.

3. Enhancing Democratic Governance

Democratic governance focuses on developing mechanisms by which decisions are made through accountable and transparent processes and through the use of representative structures to enhance democracy. The overall emphasis is on developing effective and responsive governance mechanisms that equalize power and democratize authority relations, and that foster conflict resolution and collaboration. Again, the focus is on fostering an enabling political environment where the forms of participation and structures contribute to, enhance, and deepen democracy.

Table 2: The Key Processes and Structures that Enhance the Democratic Potential of Global Governance Institutions

<p>1. Democratic Participation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Inclusion and Equal Access</i> • <i>Broad Representation</i> • <i>Meaningful Forums for Consultation</i>
<p>2. Democratic Empowerment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Equality and Representing for Diversity: How to ensure all key stakeholders and perspectives are represented at the table?</i> • <i>Voice: How to strengthen and amplify the voice of key stakeholders, especially the disadvantaged and disenfranchised?</i> • <i>Democratic Knowledge & Learning (public education and skills-building)</i> • <i>Advocacy and Mobilization</i> • <i>Deliberation and Contestation (Debate, Consent & Dissent)</i>

3. Democratic Governance

- *Open and Transparent Decision-Making Processes*
- *Accountable Processes (and Authorities)*
- *Effective and Responsive Governance*
- *Equalization of Power and Democratization of Authority Relations*
- *Mechanisms for Conflict Resolution and Collaboration*

B. Principles for Enhancing Democratic Legitimacy of Global Governance²⁸

What should be the guiding principles for ensuring the democratic legitimacy of global governance? How do we define (and balance) these principles? And how do we apply these principles to create a more democratic architecture for global governance? These are not simple or straight forward questions to answer as they challenge the fundamental legitimacy of existing global governance institutions, the authority by which these institutions create rules that assert pre-eminence, and the overarching principles that ultimately shape and inform these institutions' priorities, processes, policies, practices and actions. *Table 3* below highlights five key dimensions in terms of *principles, priorities, processes, policies* and *practices*, referred to here as the 5Ps, for advancing global democracy.

Principles: What are key guiding principles (or values) that advance global democracy?

- *Equity (Equitable Human Development)*
- *Inclusion (Empowerment)*
- *Justice (Human Rights and the Rule of Law)*
- *Peace (Human Security)*
- *Respect for Cultural Diversity*
- *Ecological Sustainability*

Priorities: What are key strategic priorities that will advance global democracy?

- *Accountability*
Here democratic legitimacy is based on whether decision-makers are accountable to stakeholders for their decisions, policies, practices and actions. The focus is on ensuring that appropriate checks are in place so that decision-makers do not abuse their roles or hijack the institution. For example, one fundamental concern is how to hold transnational corporations and transnational capital accountable to the broader public interest. In terms of strategy, the international convention for corporate accountability is seen as a positive tool for the monitoring and enforcing of 'good' corporate conduct.
- *Institutional Independence*
The emphasis here is on how to ensure the institutional independence of global governance institutions by limiting undue influence by one or more stakeholders.

For example, some civil society leaders have concerns that transnational corporations may exercise greater influence in shaping the agenda and overall priorities of the United Nations' Global Compact, and thus limit its institutional independence and democratic legitimacy.

- *Representation and Public Participation*
The focus is on ensuring broad public participation and representation of voices and perspectives across the full continuum of stakeholders. What is the basis for legitimate representation? This question suggests the need to reconsider the prevailing forms, terms, and rules of representation (e.g., one state, one vote) at the global level. Is representation at the global level the sole domain of states or not? Under what conditions, if any, do representatives of transnational corporations, civil society organizations and networks, social movements, and communities belong at the table as key stakeholders? What steps are needed to resolve the Northern bias in the present configuration and representation of global institutions? This important perspective reinforces the need to strengthen Southern voices and the processes for participation in these institutions.
- *Subsidiarity*
The emphasis is on locating decision making at the lowest level of governance possible, in order that the people can exercise their voice and influence the decisions that most affect them.
- *Transparency*
The focus is on opening up the decision-making processes of global governance institutions to public review and scrutiny. Possible strategies include strengthening provisions for public access to information, and for representatives' public disclosure of their roles and interests.

Processes: *What are key processes (and mechanisms) that will advance global democracy?*

- *Agenda Setting*
What processes will enable key stakeholders to have a role in shaping and setting the agenda of global governance institutions?
- *Consultation*
What processes enable meaningful expression and full consideration of diverse voices and perspectives at the global level? The emphasis on broad consultation recognizes the need to reach out beyond states to include business and civil society, especially in multi-stakeholder processes such as the World Commission on Dams, for instance.

- *Deliberation, Debate, and Contestation*
What mechanisms will enable meaningful deliberation, debate, and even contestation of decision making about the priorities, processes, policies and practices of institutions?
- *Consent (and Dissent) in Decision-Making*
What are the mechanisms that enable broad public consensus building at the global level? Special attention is needed to reform rules to enable people to express their voice and to engage in consent (or dissent) in decision-making processes. This latter aspect highlights the importance of establishing effective mechanisms for redress, especially for disadvantaged groups and communities.

Table 3: The Key Dimensions (5Ps) for Advancing Global Democracy

<p><u>Principles:</u> <i>What are the guiding principles (i.e., norms, values) that will advance global democracy?</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Equity (Equitable Development) • Inclusion (Empowerment) • Justice (Human Rights) • Peace (Human Security) • Respect for Cultural Diversity • Ecological Sustainability
<p><u>Priorities:</u> <i>What are key strategic priorities that will advance global democracy?</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Broad Representation and Public Participation • Accountability • Transparency • Institutional Independence • Subsidiarity
<p><u>Processes:</u> <i>What are key processes (and mechanisms) that will advance global democracy?</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agenda Setting • Consultation • Deliberation, Debate, and Contestation • Consent (and Dissent) in Decision-Making
<p><u>Policies:</u> <i>What are key policy arenas and issue areas that will advance global democracy?</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Developing Debt Relief Solutions • Ensuring Access for All to Water (i.e., address concerns about privatization) • Strengthening the Human Rights Framework • Establishing Redistributive Tax Schemes (i.e., Tobin Tax)
<p><u>Practices:</u> <i>What are key practices that will advance global democracy?</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Open public meetings • Formal and informal channels for public comment and input • Independent monitoring and audits of institutions • Ombudsperson function for oversight of the institution

VII. Envisioning the Future: Promising Visions for Advancing Global Democracy

What will global democracy mean and look like in the year 2025? Will new forms of global citizenship and solidarities emerge leading citizens to mobilize broad social movements for peace and democracy around the world? Will a global parliament that represents all the world's peoples be established that leads to effective action on critical global economic, political and environmental issues? What visions will lead to effective, responsive, and meaningful forms of democratic governance at the global level?

First and foremost, there is a need to create a democratic global governance system where no one state or superpower controls and dictates the terms of the agenda, and which is accountable to the global community for its actions.²⁹ Second, many possible visions and trajectories are emerging for advancing global democracy, all of which move beyond the present global order to thinking about reforming and transforming existing global institutions as well as creating new alternative democratic institutions. Each vision requires distinct strategies to create and shape the institutions, rules, structures and normative bases for global democracy.

Table 4 below summarizes the main elements of four promising visions to advancing global democracy. These include cosmopolitan democracy, deliberative democracy, political community democracy, and radical pluralist democracy. Various elements and strands of these visions of democratic governance are already emerging at the global level. What direction the future will ultimately take will depend on the shared visions and concerted action of the diverse groups within global civil society as well as other key actors in reshaping the rules, institutions, and structures of global governance.

A. The Need for New Democratic Mechanisms and Participatory Processes

There is a critical need for fostering new democratic mechanisms and alternative participatory processes at the global level. The World Social Forum is creating a global citizen-based movement for democracy and social justice that is broadening popular participation and enhancing deliberation in its forums at the global and regional levels.³⁰ Another promising development is the creation of multi-stakeholder processes for global governance institutions such as the World Commission on Dams, which actively engages representatives from government, civil society, and the private sector through broad consultation and transparent and open deliberative processes. The Internet is seen as another democratic political space for sharing information, promoting dialogue and debate, facilitating networking, mobilizing advocacy, and fostering global solidarities for collective action.³¹ In addition, one important challenge is to find ways to engage national parliamentarians in decision-making processes on global issues, such as the idea of establishing a global parliament. Important questions remain to be resolved about the desirability, viability and achievability of various proposals for a global parliament.

Many view a democratic, accountable state as a necessary prerequisite for ensuring democracy, and for increasing the policy space for alternative development policies. Some see the state as a critical actor in facilitating an ethical form of globalization in two

areas: (1) democratizing the decision-making processes of key global institutions (i.e., IMF, World Bank, World Trade Organization); and (2) democratizing the global economy, for example, by promoting fair trade over free trade.

TABLE 4: MAIN VISIONS FOR GLOBAL DEMOCRACY

Democratic Vision	Main Elements	Main Proponents
<i>Cosmopolitan Democracy</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Envisions a set of institutions at multiple levels for decision-making in key global arenas (economic, political, security). • Requires the establishment of a democratic constitutional and legal framework through a complex network of multi-layered, institutional mechanisms and procedures. • Emphasizes global citizenship within a top-down institutional approach to global democracy. 	Archibugi & Held (1995), Archibugi, Held, & Kohler (1998), Held & McGrew (2002), Archibugi (2003), Held (2003, 2004), Held & Koenig-Archibugi (2003)
<i>Deliberative Democracy</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focuses on developing public spaces for meaningful democratic deliberation that pragmatically address the real needs of people through direct democratic participation. • Emphasizes a bottom-up, decentralized approach to global democracy. 	Dryzek (1990, 2000), Drydyk & Penz (1997), Bohman (1999), Fung & Wright (2002), Sen (2003)
<i>Political Community Democracy</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emphasizes designing and modifying existing international regimes of global governance to enhance popular participation and incorporate transparency norms, thus creating a shared political community and the basis for democratic global authority. • Seeks to combine both top-down and bottom-up mechanisms to promote global democracy. 	Samhat & Payne (2003), Etzioni (2004), Payne & Samhat (2004)
<i>Radical Pluralist Democracy</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emphasis on pluralist visions of democratic governance guided by the priority of subsidiarity, locating authority at the lowest appropriate level of decision-making. • Seeks to foster plural venues and actors to build a multi-level infrastructure for democratic governance from the local to global levels. 	Loomis (1999), Dallmayr (2001), Patomaki (2001, 2003), Rikkila & Sehm Patomaki (2001, 2003), Patomaki, Teivainen & Ronkko (2002), Bello (2003), Chase-Dunn & Boswell (2004), Patomaki & Teivainen 2004

A. Democratizing Key Global Governance Institutions

Where are the key venues and global governance institutions where global civil society is likely to have the greatest influence in advancing global democracy? **Table 5** below assesses the democratic potential of key global governance institutions in terms of the three objectives of enhancing democratic participation, empowerment, and governance. The top of the table focuses on those approaches where global civil society may have a *direct impact*, i.e., those venues and institutions where global civil society may exert significant democratic influence on a key global governance institution, such as the World Social Forum and regional social forums; parliamentary initiatives; and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations. In addition, **Table 5** also highlights those institutions where global civil society may have an *indirect impact* by collaborating multi-sectorally to exert democratic influence on key global governance institutions. This latter strategy means global civil society must mobilize its efforts in conjunction with other key actors, ranging from citizens to global institutions, states, transnational corporations and the media. These include the United Nations, the international financial institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organization (WTO), and the G-20 and L-20 initiatives to establish a more democratic and effective body to the G-8 at the level of heads-of-state by broadening representation to include leading emerging market countries from the developing world.³²

VIII. Proposals for Advancing Global Democracy

- *What key institutions and rules are needed to enhance global democracy?*
- *How do these institutions and rules enhance democratic participation, empowerment, and governance at the global level?*
- *What are the most promising opportunities for reforming and transforming existing global institutions as well as creating alternative global democratic institutions?*
- *What steps are necessary to ensure that global democracy fosters democratic participation and processes at multiple levels (i.e., local, national, regional, and global) for responsive governance?*

The overall focus of the framing questions presented above is on developing promising visions for democratizing global governance, and assessing what is required to actualize these visions through the following four distinct but mutually reinforcing institutional approaches. These approaches include empowering a democratic global civil society, actualizing the democratic potential of parliamentary initiatives, and building democratic linkages at the local, national, regional and global levels that each contribute to democratizing the institutions and rules of the global economy and global governance. An initial, but not exhaustive, list of promising strategies for further debate and action are proposed for enhancing democratic participation, empowerment and governance.

TABLE 5: Assessing the Democratic Potential of Key Global Governance Institutions

Global Governance Institution	Democratic Participation	Democratic Empowerment	Democratic Governance
Direct Impact			
<i>World Social Forum</i>	Local, national, and global civil society actors: ++	Local, national, and global civil society actors: + (+)	Local, national, and global civil society actors: - ?
<i>World Parliament</i>	<i>Parliamentarians</i> : + ? <i>World Citizens</i> : + ? <i>Civil Society Actors</i> : + ?	<i>Parliamentarians</i> : + ? <i>World Citizens</i> : + ? <i>Civil Society Actors</i> : + ?	<i>Parliamentarians</i> : + - <i>World Citizens</i> : + ? <i>Civil Society Actors</i> : + ?
<i>ECOSOC</i>	States & civil society: ++	States & civil society: +?	States & civil society: + -
Indirect Impact			
<i>United Nations</i>	Limited to member states Security Council: - - General Assembly: + - <i>People's Assembly</i> : + ? <i>Civil Society Forum</i> : ++	Security Council: - - General Assembly: + ? <i>People's Assembly</i> : ++ <i>Civil Society Forum</i> : ++	Security Council: - - General Assembly: + - <i>People's Assembly</i> : + ? <i>Civil Society Forum</i> : + ?
<i>World Bank</i>	Limited to member states One-country/one vote: + -	Bias toward few key states One-country/one vote: - -	Bias toward few key states One-country/one vote: - -
<i>International Monetary Fund</i>	Limited to member states Voting quotas: - -	Bias toward few key states Voting quotas: + -	Bias toward few key states Voting quotas: - -
<i>World Trade Organization</i>	Members states & civic actors One-country/one vote: + -	Members states & civic actors One-country/one vote: + -	Members states & civic actors One-country/one vote: + -
<i>G-20/L-20</i>	Emerging Market States: + -	Emerging Market States: + ?	Emerging Market States: + ?

Key: High Positive Potential: ++; Mixed Potential: + - ; High Negative Potential: - -; Uncertain Potential: ?

A. Empowering a Democratic Global Civil Society: The World Social Forum and Other Civil Society Initiatives

□ Strengthen the democratic capacity of global civil society

- Strengthen the democratic legitimacy of civil society organizations and networks by developing accountable, open and transparent decision-making processes.³³
- Strengthen and diversify the voices of citizens participating in and representing civil society.
- Develop participatory mechanisms that foster intercultural dialogue that informs and enhances democratic learning, processes and practices.³⁴
- Support greater elaboration and strategic understanding among the diverse actors of civil society organizations (e.g., labor unions, NGOs, networks, social movements) about the particular democratic roles (e.g., citizen education, public deliberation, monitoring, lobbying) that they play, and how they can cooperate most effectively to influence the democratic priorities, processes, and policies, and practices of states, regional bodies, transnational corporations and global governance institutions.³⁵
- Strengthen and expand civil society information sharing, networking, and advocacy through the use of a wide range of information and communication technologies (ICTs).³⁶
- Scale up the advocacy capacity of civil society organizations by creating broad-based democratic networks, coalitions, and social movements that build grassroots linkages with citizens and other key actors on important global issues (e.g., debt relief, peace).³⁷

□ Support alternative institutional strategies emerging from global civil society

- Strengthen the World Social Forum as a mechanism for fostering democratic knowledge, learning, skills-building, and strategic action by citizens and civil society organizations, networks, and social movements; and extend its democratic processes for enhancing citizen participation and deliberation from the global to the regional, national, and local levels.³⁸
- Create a global redistribution mechanism for taxation, such as a currency transaction tax (CTT) or Tobin tax, to generate the necessary resources to fund global priorities.³⁹
- Strengthen democratic innovation and learning by civil society organizations in creating diverse, alternative counter-institutions (e.g., International Convention on Cultural Diversity) and processes (e.g., Social Forums) that enhance democratic participation, empowerment, and governance.

B. Democratizing the Global Economy and Global Governance: Rethinking the Roles of Multilateral Institutions, Rules, and Key Actors at the Global Level

❑ *Promote the democratic regulation of the global economy*

- Regulate global markets to enable greater democratic control and financial stability.⁴⁰
- Strengthen corporate social responsibility measures by developing a code of conduct governing the environmental, labor, and social practices of transnational corporations.⁴¹
- Reform the United Nation's Global Compact to ensure broad participation, representation, and effective deliberation across all sectors.⁴²
- Establish effective global redistributive tax mechanisms.⁴³
- Create global anti-trust mechanisms to protect trade and commerce from unlawful restraints and monopolies or unfair practices by transnational corporations.⁴⁴

❑ *Enhance equitable and sustainable development*

- Eliminate the debt of highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs), simultaneously shifting debt repayments to fund basic human needs programs (i.e., education, health care, and nutrition) for the most vulnerable people in those countries.⁴⁵
- Reform the Bretton Woods Institutions (i.e., the IMF and World Bank) by making them more accountable to broader publics.⁴⁶ Some possible strategies include: opening these institutions to civil society representatives and national parliamentarians; ensuring access to information; promoting open and transparent decision-making; fostering broader representation of developing countries and non-state actors; and altering the power distribution of these institutions by strengthening the voting rights of developing countries.⁴⁷
- Strengthen the negotiating capacity of developing countries for fair trade within the WTO.⁴⁸
- Strengthen mechanisms for civil society consultation and exchange with the IMF, World Bank and WTO.⁴⁹
- Create an Economic and Social Security Council to coordinate equitable development and poverty eradication policies and programs at the global level.⁵⁰

- Mobilize the resources and political commitments of multilateral institutions, states and civil society organizations to meet and to exceed the Millennium Development Goals for poverty alleviation and nutrition, universal education, gender equality, child mortality, maternal health, disease prevention, and environmental sustainability by 2015.⁵¹
- Create a global environmental institution with the mandate and enforcement capacity to protect the global commons.⁵²

☐ *Foster democratic reform of global governance*

- Reform the United Nations system by: (a) changing the structure, size, and representation of the Security Council; (b) enhancing the role and composition of the General Assembly; and (c) creating a People’s Assembly.⁵³
- Strengthen the United Nations’ authority and role over the IMF, World Bank, and WTO in shaping global development, economic, and trade priorities and policies.⁵⁴
- Develop more democratic alternatives to the G-8 as a leadership body, such as the G-20 and L-20 initiatives which broaden representation to include leading emerging market countries from the developing world.⁵⁵
- Establish criteria and mobilize support for democratic leadership selection processes for the heads of the IMF and World Bank.⁵⁶
- Develop criteria and mechanisms for fair negotiations among states and non-state actors in key global institutions.⁵⁷
- Establish multi-stakeholder networks and democratic processes to address pressing global issues (e.g., World Commission on Dams; access to water).⁵⁸
- Develop a permanent mechanism that moves beyond consultation to expand dialogue and to enable constructive exchange between the U.N. and civil society for fostering potential collaboration and partnerships.⁵⁹ One idea is a proposed Civil Society Forum that would consist of accredited NGOs, trade unions, and business organizations.⁶⁰

☐ *Promote peace and human security through global and regional institutions*

- Strengthen U.N. Security Council principles and procedures for the authorization of “the use of force.”⁶¹
- Strengthen measures for non-proliferation of arms and disarmament, as well as for regulation of the arms trade.⁶²
- Target efforts toward non-signatory states to ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty.⁶³
- Establish permanent peace-keeping forces and a Peace-Building Commission at the United Nations.⁶⁴
- Enhance early-warning monitoring capacity at the regional and global levels to prevent major humanitarian crises.⁶⁵

- Require key global institutions to develop “security, social exclusion and equity impact reviews of all global development measures.”⁶⁶

□ *Strengthen international law and human rights*

- Empower the U.N. Security Council to exercise its right to refer major human rights violation cases to the International Criminal Court (ICC).⁶⁷
- Establish human rights and democratic standards for membership on the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.⁶⁸
- Reassert the primacy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in taking “precedence over all other agreements, regimes, treaties, in economic, trade and related development fields.”⁶⁹
- Strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to protect the “democratic rights of all people,” particularly the rights of women, minorities, indigenous peoples, and religious and cultural groups.
- Expand the jurisdictions of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ).⁷⁰
- Strengthen human rights law in the regional courts.⁷¹

C. Realizing the Democratic Potential of Parliamentary Initiatives: National, Regional and Global Perspectives

□ *Establish the oversight role of national parliaments*

- Enact and implement legislation requiring that the national parliaments of developing countries are engaged in the participation, review, public debate and ratification processes over the economic policy prescriptions and loan agreements of the international financial institutions and regional development banks.⁷²

□ *Strengthen parliamentary oversight of global and regional institutions*

- Enhance national parliamentarians’ oversight of the economic priorities, policies and lending practices of international financial institutions (i.e., IMF, World Bank) and the regional development banks.⁷³
- Create a parliamentary body that allows for broad representation of developing countries and other stakeholders in their oversight of rule-making in the WTO.⁷⁴

□ *Support the development of a global parliament and e-parliamentary initiatives*

- Build the political constituency for creating a democratically-elected global parliament that represents all of the world's peoples.⁷⁵
- Strengthen the organizational, procedural and technical capacities now being developed for an e-parliament facilitated through electronic communications for a global forum that links members of parliament and congress to exchange information and views on important global issues.⁷⁶

D. Building Democratic Linkages at the Local, National, Regional & Global Levels: Identifying Strategic Possibilities for Responsive Democratic Governance

□ *Foster supportive initiatives that strengthen and reinforce democratic governance*

- Establish Freedom of Information (FOI) laws at the local to the national levels in order to promote public sector transparency and accountability, and to strengthen mechanisms for responsive governance. Civil society can support such efforts through training, campaigns, and advocacy.
- Enhance democratic governance through regional institutions and treaties that recognize human rights, sustainable development, cultural diversity and indigenous rights (e.g., the Organization of American States Charter).
- Strengthen the transparency and accountability of regional development banks.
- Create effective forms of regional democratic governance (e.g., European Union).
- Expand the spaces and opportunities for the active democratic participation and deliberation by citizens in local and national governance.
- Secure and (re-)invigorate the rights, cultures, and identities of peoples, including indigenous people and marginalized groups, in local and national democratic processes.
- Strengthen mechanisms for democratic accountability and decision-making between grassroots citizens' movements and groups within global civil society.

E. Ensuring that Global Institutions Advance Key Civil Society Goals

What do these various approaches for advancing global democracy (i.e., enhancing participation, empowerment, and governance) mean for addressing each of the conference's six main tracks highlighted below? **Table 6** assesses the democratic potential of key global institutions to fulfill the six civil society goals (as identified by the G05 conference's six main tracks) that contribute to advancing global democracy. The challenge is to develop a consensus about the main priorities for realizing key civil society goals and to identify innovative strategies, processes and practices to meet these goals that may contribute to advancing global democracy.

Global Democracy 2005 Conference Tracks

Track 1: Civil Society Engagement and Changing Territorial Priorities?

Track 2: International Treaties and Law: A Hierarchy of Values?

Track 3: Global Security: Undermining Democracy?

Track 4: Civil Society Participation: Opportunities and Responsibilities

Track 5: How to Democratically Regulate the Global Economy?

Track 6: Maintaining Cultural Diversity in Global Diversity?

This analysis clearly shows that certain institutions have greater potential than others in making progress on these six goals. What is the proper mix of institutions to address and to fulfill the various civil society goals represented by the six tracks? What specific reforms are necessary in order for existing global institutions to meet these goals? Are new, alternative democratic institutions required to support these goals? It is important to identify possible linkages and synergies for joint action within and across these tracks and goals. This analysis highlights the multiple factors at play that affect the overall prospects for advancing global democracy.

Table 6: Assessing the Democratic Potential of Key Global Institutions to Fulfill Six Civil Society Goals

Global Governance Institution	<u>Track 1: Enhance Regional & Local Democratic Governance?</u>	<u>Track 2: Enhance & Sustain Democratic Values for Laws & Treaties?</u>	<u>Track 3: Enhance Global Security?</u>	<u>Track 4: Enhance Participation & Empowerment of Civil Society?</u>	<u>Track 5: Enhance the Democratic Regulation of the Global Economy?</u>	<u>Track 6: Maintain & Sustain Cultural Diversity?</u>
Direct Impact						
<i>World Social Forum</i>	++	+?	-?	++	-?	++
<i>World Parliament</i>	+?	+?	+?	+?	+?	+/-
<i>ECOSOC</i>	+?	++	+?	+?	+?	+?
Indirect Impact						
<i>United Nations</i>	+-	+?	+?	+-	+-	+-
<i>World Bank</i>	-?	+-	-?	+-	+-	-?
<i>International Monetary Fund</i>	-?	-?	-?	--	+-	--
<i>World Trade Organization</i>	-?	-?	-?	--	+-	--
<i>G-20/L-20</i>	+?	+?	+?	-?	+?	-?

Key: *High Positive Potential: ++; Mixed Potential: +-; High Negative Potential: --; Uncertain Potential: ?*

IX. CONCLUSION

The challenge of the 21st century is to reinvigorate and reinvent democratic participation, empowerment and governance in meaningful ways that lead to real possibilities for advancing global democracy. These daily struggles and future visions offer valuable perspectives for enhancing democratic participation, and for addressing the deficits of global institutions. It is the hope that global civil society, diverse in its interests, but potentially united in its aspirations for a more just and democratic world, can engage with other key actors in creating a global democratic future.

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ENDNOTES

¹ Sen 1999: 4.

² For example, see: Archibugi & Held 1995; Fierlbeck 1998; Holden 2000; O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte & Williams 2000; Aksu & Camilleri 2002; Held & McGrew 2002; Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 2002; Patomaki, Teivanen & Ronkko 2002, 2004; Scholte 2002, 2004a,b; Slaughter 2002, 2003; Florini 2003; Held 2003, 2004; Chase-Dunn & Boswell 2004; Payne & Samhat 2004; Schmitz 2004; Smith 2004; Castells 2005.

³ See the work of: Ichiyo 1994; Bello 2001; Rikkila & Sehm 2001, 2002; Hemispheric Social Alliance 2002; Klein 2002; Cavanagh et al. 2003; Clark 2003; Fisher & Ponniah 2003; Monbiot 2003; Oxfam America & Citizens for Global Solutions 2003; GlobeScan 2004; Teivanen 2004; Third World Network 2004.

⁴ Over the past decade, a number of political leaders and commissions have called for reforming and democratizing global governance, including: the U.N. Commission on Global Governance 1995; Boutros-Ghali 2000, 2004; Monterrey Consensus 2002; Annan 2003, 2005; U.N. High-Level Panel 2004; United Nations 2004; Martin 2005.

⁵ See: Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 2002; Scholte 2002, 2004a,b; Laxer & Halperin 2003; Smith 2004.

⁶ See: Sikkink 2002; Florini 2003.

⁷ These figures come from the Global Accountability Report 2003. For more information, see Kovach, Neligan & Burall 2003: iv.

⁸ See Scholte 2004c.

⁹ See Riker & Nelson 2003.

¹⁰ See Scholte 2004c.

¹¹ See Riker & Nelson 2003.

¹² See Scholte 2004.

¹³ See Riker & Nelson 2003.

¹⁴ See Riker & Nelson 2003.

¹⁵ This table is adapted from Scholte 2004c; and Riker & Nelson 2003: 17.

¹⁶ U.N. Commission on Global Governance 1995; Holden 2000; Held 2004.

¹⁷ For the case of the International Monetary Fund, see Kapur & Naim 2005; on the WTO, see Esty 2000, 2002; Lacarte 2004; Shaffer 2004; Skaggs 2004.

¹⁸ GlobeScan 2004: 6-7.

¹⁹ Global Governance Initiative 2004.

²⁰ Langley 2004: 69.

²¹ Johansen 2003: 2.

²² Johansen 2003: 3.

²³ Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 2002; Scholte 2004c.

²⁴ Johansen 2003: 3.

²⁵ Over a half a million people were estimated to have been killed in the massacres in Rwanda in 1994 (Peou 2001:119). As Sorpong Peou notes: “In April 2000, the Security Council accepted responsibility for having failed to stop the massacres and vowed to prevent such atrocities – a vow remaining to be fulfilled” (2001: 119). For further details about the respective roles of the United Nations, Western states and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in the Rwandan tragedy, see Peou 2001; Barnett 2002.

²⁶ In both campaigns, the scale of the mobilization efforts was global. Over 1,200 international NGOs from 60 countries were members of the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines (ICBL) (Bruhl & Rittenberger 2001:8). An estimated 17 million people from 160 countries signed an international petition calling on the G-7 to cancel “the unpayable debt of highly-indebted poor countries” by 2000 (Donnelly 2002: 155).

²⁷ Chase-Dunn & Boswell 2004: 3.

²⁸ This section draws directly on analysis from Scholte & Riker 2003: 12-13.

²⁹ As Suzanne Nossel argues: “a superpower in a [global] democratic system is like a superhero stripped of some powers. Increasingly, the hegemonic state cannot dictate to others, garner support by snapping its fingers, or brush away obstacles with wave of its hand... It will have to clean up after others, accede to international norms, and even sacrifice some of its power in deference to others’ views and needs” (Nossel 2003: 60).

³⁰ Fisher & Ponniah 2003; Teivainen 2004; Smith 2004.

³¹ For example, see Klein 2001; Hajnal 2002a; Drake 2003.

³² Paul Martin, Prime Minister of Canada, is a key proponent for developing the L-20, an alternative leadership body to the G-8 that promotes fiscally, socially, and environmentally responsible global governance policies (Martin 2005).

³³ Scholte & Riker 2003; Scholte 2004c; Tandon 2005.

³⁴ Scholte 2004c.

³⁵ Scholte & Riker 2003.

³⁶ The strategic use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) has empowered civil society organizations and networks and mobilized social movements, effectively enabling them to influence the processes, policies, and practices of states, global governance institutions, and transnational corporations (Hajnal 2002a: 243-246).

³⁷ Khagram, Riker & Sikkink, 2002; Scholte 2004.

³⁸ Grzybowski 2001; Patomaki, Teivainen & Ronkko 2002; Patomaki & Teivainen 2004; Smith 2004.

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- ³⁹ See the work of ATTAC (www.attac.org); Ul Haq 1996; Patomaki 2001; Round 2002; Dawkins 2003; Weaver, Dodd & Baker 2003; Held 2004.
- ⁴⁰ See Calliari & Schroeder 2001; Cavanagh et al. 2002; Held 2004.
- ⁴¹ Paul & Garred 2000; Cavanagh et al. 2002; Dawkins 2003; Held 2004; Palacios.
- ⁴² Ruggie 2000; 2004; Dawkins 2003; Richter 2003; Held 2004.
- ⁴³ Paul & Garred 2000; Patomaki 2001; Patomaki, Teivainen, & Ronkko 2002; Patomaki & Teivainen 2004; Dawkins 2003; Held 2004; Scholte 2004c.
- ⁴⁴ Paul & Garred 2000; Held 2004; Scholte 2004c.
- ⁴⁵ Patomaki, Teivainen, & Ronkko 2002; Dawkins 2003; Patomaki & Teivainen 2004; Held 2004.
- ⁴⁶ Some leading civil society activists see little prospect for reforming the Bretton Woods Institutions, especially the IMF and WTO, with some arguing for transforming their roles and “shrinking” these institutions or for abolishing them altogether. See, for example, Bello 2001, 2003; Cavanagh et al. 2002; Rikkila & Sehm Patomaki 2002; Third World Network 2004.
- ⁴⁷ On the issue of increasing the voting rights of developing countries, see the work of G-24 Secretariat (www.g24.org) and the New Rules for Global Finance Coalition (www.new-rules.org).
- ⁴⁸ Stiglitz 2002; Held 2004.
- ⁴⁹ Esty 1998, 2000, 2002; Stiglitz 2002; Gould 2004.
- ⁵⁰ Malhotra 2002; Patomaki, Teivainen, & Ronkko 2002; Held 2004; Patomaki & Teivainen 2004.
- ⁵¹ The Millennium Development Goals are available at: www.un.org/millenniumgoals. For details about the resource and political challenges in meeting these goals, see the work of Jeffrey Sachs (2005).
- ⁵² Esty & Ivanova 2002, 2003; Held 2004.
- ⁵³ United Nations High-Level Panel 2004; Patomaki, Teivainen, & Ronkko 2002; Dawkins 2003; Etzioni 2004; Patomaki & Teivainen 2004; GlobeScan 2005; Tandon 2005.
- ⁵⁴ A recent survey of global stakeholders found that a key priority for reform should be to “make the World Bank, IMF and World Trade Organization (WTO) more accountable to the U.N.” (GlobeScan 2005: 20, available at: www.2020Fund.org). See also, Dawkins 2003; Patomaki & Teivainen 2004; Sampson 2004; Tandon 2005.
- ⁵⁵ Amato 2003; Carin & Smith 2004; Martin 2005.
- ⁵⁶ See Kapur & Naim 2005; See the statement of the IFI Democracy Coalition at: <http://www.new-rules.org/docs/ifidemocracycoalitionstatement.htm>
- ⁵⁷ Held 2004: 165.
- ⁵⁸ Dubash, Dupar, Kothari & Lissu 2002; Held 2004; Khagram 2004.
- ⁵⁹ The work of the High-Level Panel on U.N.-Civil Society Relations chaired by former Brazilian President Fernando Enrique Cardoso offers proposals for action (United Nations 2004).

⁶⁰ GlobeScan 2005: 20.

⁶¹ United Nations High-Level Panel 2004; Held 2004; Payne & Samhat 2005.

⁶² United Nations High-Level Panel 2004; Held 2004.

⁶³ United Nations High-Level Panel 2004.

⁶⁴ United Nations High-Level Panel 2004; Held 2004.

⁶⁵ Held 2004: 165; United Nations High-Level Panel 2004; Sachs 2005.

⁶⁶ Held 2004: 165.

⁶⁷ United Nations High-Level Panel 2004; Gould 2004; Held 2004.

⁶⁸ United Nations High-Level Panel 2004; Gould 2004; Held 2004.

⁶⁹ Tandon 2005: 20; Dawkins 2003.

⁷⁰ Patomaki, Teivainen, & Ronkko 2002; Patomaki & Teivainen 2004; Dawkins 2003; Gould 2004; Held 2004; Tandon 2005.

⁷¹ Held 2004: 165.

⁷² See, for instance, the International Parliamentarians' Petition (IPP) at: www.ippinfo.org.

⁷³ For example, the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank (PNoWB) has emerged as an independent body to facilitate networking among parliamentarians, in order to strengthen collective advocacy towards and to improve the accountability and transparency of the policies and practices of the World Bank. For more information on this non-partisan network of parliamentarians, see: www.pnowb.org

⁷⁴ Charnovitz 2004; Kapoor 2004; Mann 2004; Shaffer 2004; Skaggs 2004.

⁷⁵ See the pioneering work of Falk & Strauss 2001, 2002; Monbiot 2002; Patomaki, Teivainen, & Ronkko 2002; Dawkins 2003; Patomaki & Teivainen 2004.

⁷⁶ See Johansen 2003.